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Abstract — Safety and reliability are important in the cloud 
computing environment. This is especially true today as 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks constitute one of the 
largest threats faced by Internet users and cloud computing 
services. DDoS attacks target the resources of these services, 
lowering their ability to provide optimum usage of the network 
infrastructure. Due to the nature of cloud computing, the 
methodologies for preventing or stopping DDoS attacks are quite 
different compared to those used in traditional networks. In this 
paper, we investigate the effect of DDoS attacks on cloud 
resources and recommend practical defense mechanisms against 
different types of DDoS attacks in the cloud environment. 
Keywords: cloud computing; network; security; DDoS; 
vulnerabilities. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is the utilization of hardware and 
software combined to provide services to end users over a 
network like the internet. It includes a set of virtual machines 
that simulate physical computers and provide services, such as 
operating systems and applications. However, configuring 
virtualization in a cloud computing environment is critical 
when deploying a cloud computing system. A cloud computing 
structure relies on three service layers: Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a 
Service (SaaS) (Fig. 1). IaaS gives users access to physical 
resources, networks, bandwidth, and storage. PaaS builds on 
IaaS and gives end users access to the operating systems and 
platforms necessary to build and develop applications, such as 
databases. SaaS provides end users with access to software 
applications. 
 
Figure 1.  Cloud Computing Architecture 
DDoS attacks are major security risks in a cloud computing 
environment, where resources are shared by many users. A 
DDoS attack targets resources or services in an attempt to 
render them unavailable by flooding system resources with 
heavy amounts of unreal traffic. The objective of DDoS attacks 
is to consume resources, such as memory, CPU processing 
space, or network bandwidth, in an attempt to make them 
unreachable to end users by blocking network communication 
or denying access to services. Dealing with DDoS attacks at all 
layers in cloud systems is a major challenge due to the 
difficulty of distinguishing the attacker’s requests from 
legitimate user requests, even though the former come from a 
large number of distributed machines.  
In this paper, we present an in-depth analysis of DDoS 
attacks in cloud computing and discuss the challenges in 
defending against these attacks. Section 2 provides an overview 
of DDoS attacks. Section 3 examines the effects of different 
types of DDoS attack and the recommended defense 
mechanisms for each type. Section 4 summarizes the results of 
investigations on DDoS attacks in the cloud system. Finally, 
Section 5 presents a brief summary of the paper. 
II. DDOS OVERVIEW 
DDoS attacks have become more sophisticated. Many 
websites and large companies are targeted by these types of 
attacks. The first DDoS attack was reported in 1999 [1]. In 
2000, large resource companies, such as Yahoo, Amazon, 
CNN.com and eBay, were targeted by DDoS attacks, and their 
services were stopped for hours [2]. Register.com was targeted 
by a DDoS in 2001; this was the first DDoS attack to use DNS 
servers as reflectors [3]. In 2002, service disruption was 
reported at 9 of 13 DNS root servers due to DNS backbone 
DDoS attacks. This attack recurred in 2007 and disrupted two 
DNS root servers. In 2003, Microsoft was targeted by Worm 
Blaster. One million computers were attacked by MyDoom in 
2004. In 2007, a DDoS attack was carried out by thousands of 
computers, targeting more than 10,000 online game servers. In 
2008, a DDoS attack targeting Wordpress.com caused 15 
minutes of denial [4]. In 2009, GoGrid, a cloud computing 
provider, was targeted by a large DDoS attack, affecting 
approximately half of its thousands of customers. In 2009, 
Register.com was affected again by a DDoS attack. In the same 
year, some social networking sites, including Facebook and 
Twitter, were targeted by a DDoS. Many websites were 
attacked by DDoS in 2010, including the Australian Parliament 
House website, Optus, Web24, Vocus, and Burma’s main 
Internet provider. In 2011, Visa, MasterCard, PayPal, and 
 
 
PostFinance were targeted by a DDoS that aimed to support the 
WikiLeaks founder [4]. In the same year, the site of the 
National Election Commission of South Korea was targeted by 
DDoS attacks. Furthermore, thousands of infected computers 
participated in a DDoS attack that targeted the Asian E-
Commerce Company in 2011 [4]. In 2012, the official website 
of the office of the vice-president of Russia was unavailable for 
15 hours due to a DDoS attack [4]. In the same year, many 
South Korean and United States (US) websites were targeted 
by a DDoS. Godaddy.com websites reported service outages 
because of such an attack. In 2012, major US banks and 
financial institutions became the target of a DDoS attack.  
DDoS attacks are evolving rapidly and are targeting large 
companies, which cause huge financial losses to those 
companies and websites globally. Consequently, investigating 
DDoS attacks in the cloud system is vital along with 
recommending mechanisms to mitigate such attacks. 
III. DDOS ATTACKS AND DEFENSES 
DDoS attacks affect all layers of the cloud system (IaaS, 
PaaS, and SaaS) and can occur internally or externally. An 
external cloud-based DDoS attack starts from outside the cloud 
environment and targets cloud-based services. This type of 
attack affects the availability of services. The most affected 
layers in the cloud system by an external DDoS attack are the 
SaaS and PaaS layers. An internal cloud-based DDoS attack 
occurs within the cloud system, primarily in the PaaS and IaaS 
layers, and can occur in several ways. For example, the 
attackers may take advantage of the trial periods of cloud 
services of some vendors. As a result, an authorized user within 
the cloud environment can launch a DoS attack on the victim’s 
machine internally. On the other hand, sharing infected virtual 
machine images could allow an attacker to control and use the 
infected virtual machines to carry out an internal DDoS attack 
on the targeted machine within the same cloud computing 
system. A DDoS includes different types of attacks. 
Descriptions of those attacks and recommended practical 
defense mechanisms in the cloud system are presented in the 
following sections. 
A. IP spoofing attack 
In the Internet Protocol (IP) spoofing attack, packet 
transmissions between the end user and the cloud server can be 
intercepted and their headers modified such that the IP source 
field in the IP packet is forged by either a legitimate IP address, 
as shown in Fig. 2, or by an unreachable IP address. As a 
result, the server will respond to the legitimate user machine, 
which affects the legitimate user machine, or the server will be 
unable to complete the transaction to the unreachable IP 
address, which affects the server resources. Tracing such an 
attack is difficult due to the fake IP address of the IP source 
field in the IP packet. The methods for detecting an IP spoofing 
attack can be applied in the PaaS layer or in the network 
resources on the IaaS layer. 
Due to the difficulty of modifying and upgrading different 
types of network resources in the cloud system, hop-count 
filtering (HCF) [5] can be used to distinguish legitimate IPs 
from spoofed IPs in the PaaS layer. The HCF counts the 
number of hops depending on the value of the Time to Live 
(TTL) field in the IP header. IP-to-hop-count (IP2HC) mapping 
is built to detect the spoofed packet. An analysis concluded by 
Wang et al. [5] indicated that 90% of spoofed addresses can be 
detected using the HCF method. One drawback of this method 
is that attackers can build their own IP2HC mapping to avoid 
HCF. A trust-based approach to detect spoofed IP addresses 
can be used in the access routers on the IaaS layer [6], but 
another compatible solution should be proposed to detect IP 
spoofing in distribution routers. 
 
Figure 2.  IP spoofing attack 
B. SYN flooding attack 
A Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection starts 
with a three-way handshake, as shown in Fig. 3(a). A typical 
three-way handshake between a legitimate user and the server 
begins by sending a connection request from the legitimate user 
to the server in the form of a synchronization (SYN) message. 
Then, the server acknowledges the SYN by sending back 
(SYN-ACK) a request to the legitimate user. Finally, the 
legitimate user sends an ACK request to the server to establish 
the connection. SYN flooding occurs when the attacker sends a 
huge number of packets to the server but does not complete the 
process of the three-way handshake. As a result, the server 
waits to complete the process for all of those packets, which 
makes the server unable to process legitimate requests, as 
shown in Fig. 3(b). Also, SYN flooding can be carried out by 
sending packets with a spoofed IP address. A sniffing attack is 
considered a type of SYN flooding attack. In a sniffing attack, 
the attacker sends a packet with the predicted sequence number 
of an active TCP connection with a spoofed IP address. Thus, 
the server is unable to reply to that request, which affects the 
resource performance of the cloud system.  
 
Figure 3.  SYN flooding attack 
 
 
Many defense mechanisms against SYN flooding attack 
can be used in the PaaS and IaaS layers [7]. The SYN cache 
approach [8], which establishes a connection with a legitimate 
request, can be considered in the PaaS layer, but this causes an 
increase in latency by 15%. The SYN cookies defense 
mechanism [8] is another recommended defense mechanism in 
the PaaS layer to detect a SYN flooding attack, but it lowers 
the performance of the cloud system. Reducing the time of the 
SYN received to degrade the timeout is a recommended PaaS 
defense measure, but legitimate ACK packets could be lost. 
Moreover, some detection mechanisms, including filtering, 
firewall, and active monitoring, can be used in the IaaS layer. 
Filtering is an effective method to prevent a SYN flooding 
attack by configuring internal and external router interfaces, 
but this method is not reliable due to its limited use. The 
firewall mechanism in the IaaS layer depends on splitting the 
TCP connection, but this could affect the performance of the 
networking system. An active monitoring mechanism [9] can 
be used in the IaaS layer to monitor traffic of the TCP/IP and 
react in cases of SYN flooding. However, this approach 
depends on the SYN cookies mechanism, which leads to 
decreased performance of cloud resources. 
C. Smurf attack 
In a smurf attack, the attacker sends a large number of 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo requests. 
These requests are spoofed such that its source IP address is the 
victim’s IP, and the IP destination address is the broadcast IP 
address, as shown in Fig. 4. As a result, the victim will be 
flooded with broadcasted addresses. The worst case occurs 
when the number of hosts who reply to the ICMP echo requests 
is too large. Preventing this type of attack is difficult, but it can 
be mitigated by two different mechanisms. The first 
recommended defense mechanism in the IaaS layer is 
configuring the routers to disable the IP-directed broadcast 
command; this is disabled by default in current routers. 
However, the attacker could use the compromised device in the 
cloud system as an intermediary to send ICMP echo requests to 
the broadcast IP address locally, thereby carrying out an 
internal cloud-based DoS attack. Configuring the router in the 
IaaS layer cannot prevent a smurf attack. Consequently, a 
second defense mechanism is needed, which is configuring the 
operating systems in the PaaS layer so that there is no response 
to the ICMP packets sent to the IP broadcast addresses. 
D. Buffer overflow attack 
In a buffer overflow attack, the attacker sends an executable 
code to the victim in order to take advantage of buffer overflow 
vulnerability. As a result, the victim’s machine will be 
controlled by the attacker. The attacker could either harm the 
victim’s machine or use the infected machine to perform an 
internal cloud-based DDoS attack. Four defense mechanisms to 
prevent buffer overflow vulnerability can be used in the SaaS 
layer [10]. 
 
Figure 4.  Smurf attack 
The first mechanism is preventing such vulnerability when 
writing the source code [11]; however, time consumption is a 
limitation. Performing a check of the array bounds is a second 
recommended defense mechanism; this consists of checking 
the memory access and compiler and using safety language. 
The third defense mechanism is runtime instrumentation, 
which can either modify the return address to detect the 
vulnerability or estimate the buffer bounds then perform a 
check of the runtime bounds. The fourth recommended defense 
mechanism in the SaaS layer is analyzing the static and 
dynamic code to detect application vulnerability in this layer. 
E. Ping of death attack 
In the ping of death attack, the attacker sends an IP packet 
with a size larger than the limit of the IP protocol, which is 
65,535 bytes, as shown in Fig. 5. Handling an oversized packet 
affects the victim’s machine within the cloud system as well as 
the resources of the cloud system. Recent network resources 
and operating systems disregard any IP packets larger than 
65,535 bytes. Therefore, such attacks are not currently 
affecting any cloud system layers. 
 
Figure 5.  Ping of death attack 
F. Land attack 
This attack uses the “Land.c” program to send forged TCP 
SYN packets with the victim’s IP address in the source and 
destination fields, as shown in Fig. 6. In this case, the machine 
will receive the request from itself and crash the system. Such 
an attack is prevented in recent networking devices and 
operating systems by dropping ICMP packets that contain the 
same IP address in the source and destination fields. 
Consequently, there is no need for a land attack defense 
mechanism to be used in all layers of the cloud system. 
 
 
However, the process of checking and dropping large amounts 
of ICMP requests could affect the resources of the victim’s 
machine in the PaaS layer or the networking resources in the 
IaaS layer. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Land attack 
G. Teardrop attack 
This kind of attack uses the “Teardrop.c” program to send 
invalid overlapping values of IP fragments in the header of 
TCP packets. As a result, the victim’s machine within the cloud 
system will crash in the re-assembly process. Recent operating 
systems and network resources can handle such attacks. 
Therefore, teardrop attacks no longer affect any layers of cloud 
computing. 
IV. SUMMARY OF CLOUD-BASED DDOS ATTACK 
Based on an investigation of the major types of DDoS 
attacks, we derive a taxonomy of cloud-based DDoS attacks, as 
illustrated in Table 1. Several taxonomies of DDoS attacks 
exist [4] [12] [13]. Our classification is focused on cloud 
computing aspects, such as a cloud-based type of attack, 
recommended practical defense mechanisms, and the 
drawbacks of each defense mechanism. 
TABLE I.  TYPES OF DDOS ATTACKS ON THE CLOUD SYSTEM 
Attack Cloud-based type 
Recommended 
Practical Defense 
Mechanism 
Drawback
IP 
spoofing 
External 
Internal 
- Hop Count Filtering 
(HCF) in the PaaS 
layer [5] 
- The attacker 
can build his own 
IP2HC mapping 
to avoid HCF 
- Trust-based 
approach in the IaaS 
layer [6] 
- Another 
compatible 
solution should 
be proposed to 
detect IP 
spoofing in 
distribution 
routers 
SYN 
flooding 
External 
Internal 
- SYN cache 
approach in the PaaS 
layer [8] 
- Increase in 
latency 
- SYN cookies 
defense approach in 
the PaaS layer [8] 
- Lowers the 
performance of 
the cloud system 
- Reducing the time 
of SYN-received in 
the PaaS layer 
- Some of the 
legitimate ACK 
packets could be 
lost 
- Filtering mechanism 
in the IaaS layer 
- Not reliable due 
to the limited use 
of this method 
- Firewall mechanism 
in the IaaS layer 
- May affect the 
performance of 
the networking 
system in the 
cloud 
- Active monitoring 
mechanism in the 
IaaS layer [9] 
- Decreases
resource 
performance in 
the cloud 
Smurf 
attack 
External 
Internal 
- Configuring virtual 
machines in the PaaS 
layer 
 
- Configuring 
network resources in 
the IaaS layer 
 
Buffer 
overflow 
External 
Internal 
- Preventing when 
writing source code 
mechanism in the 
SaaS layer [10] 
- Time 
consumption 
- Performing the 
array bounds 
checking mechanism 
in the SaaS layer [10] 
 
- Runtime 
instrumentation 
mechanism in the 
SaaS layer [10] 
 
- Analyzing the static 
and dynamic code 
mechanism in the 
SaaS layer [10] 
 
Ping of 
death 
External 
Internal 
- Difficult to affect 
any layers of the 
cloud system 
currently, but the 
attack could be 
developed in the 
future 
 
Land.c 
External 
Internal 
- Difficult to affect 
any layers of the 
cloud system 
currently, but the 
attack could be 
developed in the 
future 
 
Teardrop.c 
External 
Internal 
- Difficult to affect 
any layers of the 
cloud system 
currently, but the 
attack could be 
developed in the 
future 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
DDoS attacks are currently a major threat and work against 
the availability of cloud services. With each developed defense 
mechanism against DDoS attacks, an improved attack appears. 
Defense mechanisms to protect against DDoS attacks are not 
always effective on their own. Combining different 
mechanisms to build hybrid defense mechanisms, in particular 
 
 
with different cloud computing layers, is highly recommended. 
It is extremely important to investigate the effects of these 
different types of DDoS attacks on the cloud system. In this 
paper, historical examples of DDoS attacks have been 
presented. We also investigated the effect of different types of 
DDoS attacks on the cloud environment. Finally, we analyzed 
and identified recommended defense mechanisms against 
DDoS attacks in cloud-based systems.  
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